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ABSTRACT 
 
Remindings have been shown to play an important role in concept learning, problem 
solving by analogy, and basic memory phenomena such as the spacing effect. However, little 
research has addressed their role in interpretation and understanding. The current experiment 
explores that possibility by testing whether reminding caused by semantic and contextual cues 
can bias the interpretation of homographs. Subjects were shown a list of words that included 
homographs and cue words related to a non-dominant meaning of each homograph.  For each 
word, they wrote a sentence that was scored to assess how they interpreted the ambiguous 
homograph.  In the same condition, the cue appeared several trials prior to the homograph, and 
they shared a common background image. In the different condition, the cue appeared before the 
homograph, but the two words were presented on different background images.  The reverse 
condition, in which the cue appeared after the homograph, served as a baseline.  The biasing 
effect of cue words, as revealed by a non-dominant interpretation of homographs, was higher in 
the same condition than in the different or reverse conditions.  Additionally, non-dominant 
interpretation in the same condition was significantly higher when the background image was 
correctly recognized as having been previously seen. These findings suggest that remindings 
caused by a combination of semantic and visual cues can influence word interpretation and 
understanding more generally. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Remindings are ubiquitous in everyday life.  A bank employee’s scowl reminds me of her 
rudeness on my last visit, so I choose the other teller.  I solve a data analysis problem by 
remembering a similar problem in the textbook and using that as a guide.  Research has shown 
that remindings play a critical role in enhancing memory, fostering concept learning, and even 
solving problems.  The goal of the present research is to evaluate the role of reminding in 
promoting understanding.  
 
Reminding in higher cognition 
As noted by Benjamin and Ross (2010), reminding is the process by which generalization 
and contrast can be achieved at a distance.  These processes can be seen in a number of cognitive 
domains.  For example, remindings foster problem solving by way of analogy, when problem-
solvers are reminded of the details of an earlier problem and use that information to solve a new 
one.  These processes have been studied in formal domains, like physics and mathematics.  That 
research has shown that novices are often reminded of possible analogs based on surface 
similarities.  In physics, for example, new students will solve inclined plane problems by 
reference to other inclined plane problems (Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981).  The goal of 
advanced instruction in math and physics is to encourage students to think about problems 
conceptually, and thus use deep conceptual features rather than superficial ones to guide 
reminding of relevant prior examples.  However, even many formal domains include problems 
for which superficial content is a useful clue for categorizing or solving a problem.  Remindings 
and subsequent generalization over content-similar problems may be one way such useful 
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dependencies are learned and come to be included in experts’ problem schemata (Blessing and 
Ross, 1996).   
Remindings also play a role in some theories of concept learning.  Early accounts 
claimed that people use a summary representation as a basis for classifying new items, with 
similarity to this prototype determining category membership and typicality (Rosch, 1975).  This 
prototype view eschewed any possibility of using specific category instances in future tasks, 
divorcing aspects of concept learning and use from memory of specific category members.  Later 
theories, which posited learning of exemplars as the basis for category learning (Medin & 
Schaffer, 1978; Brooks, 1978), suggested that new instances are categorized based on which 
previous instance the learner is reminded of.  These exemplar-based views accounted for data 
that prototype views did not, such as the phenomenon that people learn about the correlations of 
features within categories (Medin, Altom, Edelson, & Freko, 1982).  Additionally, there is 
evidence that remindings that occur when learning a category lead to generalizations about that 
category, and that the mechanism underlying this ability is an explicit comparison of the current 
instance with reminded instances (Ross, Perkins, & Tenpenny, 1990). 
 
Reminding and memory 
The process of reminding also plays a role in how people remember material.  For 
example, in autobiographical memory, automatic remindings may help people remember the 
order in which events occurred.  Friedman (2007) suggested that whenever one event causes the 
retrieval of a previous event, a representation for the order of those events is stored in memory.  
This hypothesis leads to the prediction that people should be more accurate at judging the 
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temporal order of related than unrelated events, which is empirically supported by several studies 
(e.g., Nairne & Neumann, 1993; Tzeng & Cotton, 1980; Winograd & Soloway, 1985). 
The spacing effect.  One domain in which the role of reminding has been considered is in 
studies of scheduling repetitions of study.  The spacing effect is the phenomenon that memory 
performance is often superior when study opportunities are spaced farther apart in time.  There 
are numerous competing theories of this basic phenomenon, two of which I will review briefly.  
Encoding variability theory states that, the farther apart two presentations of an item are, the 
greater the variety of contextual elements or encoding processes that item will have experienced.  
At the heart of this view is the idea that a second encoding opportunity that includes different 
information from the first is superior, because of the greater diversity of retrieval cues of 
encoded information that arises.  An implication of this view is that the spacing effect can be 
attenuated (or, more accurately, performance under massed presentations can be enhanced) by 
intentionally varying the context or salient features between multiple presentations of an item.  
This has been empirically shown with a variety of different materials. For instance, Bevan, 
Dukes, and Avant (1966) showed subjects pairs of pictures which represent the same concept but 
consist of either identical or different examples. For the concept ‘shoe’, for instance, they saw 
either two identical pictures of a men’s tennis shoe or two different pictures, one a men’s tennis 
shoe and one a woman’s high heel.  Memory for concepts with varying pictures was greater than 
for concepts with identical pictures.  Bevan et al. also showed the same effect with identical 
versus varied adjective-noun pairs (“maple tree” twice or “maple tree” and “oak tree”).  
Dellarosa and Bourne (1985) showed a memory advantage with varying context using spoken 
sentences.  Their subjects heard the same sentence twice with either two different speakers, or 
the same speaker both times, with memory better in the former condition.  
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These results all suggest that factors that decrease the relationship between the two 
presentations of a to-be-learned item enhance recall.  However, it is on this very count that 
encoding variability theory encounters serious problems.  Most notably, people do not remember 
one of two unrelated but spaced items better than two massed unrelated items (Ross & Landauer, 
1978).  Another complexity for encoding variability theory is evident in the results of Thios 
(1972).  He presented subjects with sentences containing homographs. The homographs were 
repeated in sentences using the same (“The hi-powered drill entered the masonry blocks” twice), 
similar (”The hi-powered drill entered the masonry blocks”, and “The electrical drill pierced the 
stone blocks”), or different (”The hi-powered drill entered the masonry blocks” and “The fire 
drill cleared the city blocks”) contexts.  His results showed that performance did not always 
increase with increasing spacing between the two events: different context repetitions showed a 
drop in performance at long lags. Appleton-Knapp, Bjork, and Wickens (2007) found a similar 
effect using repeated or varied advertisements for the same product.  More generally, it appeared 
as though spacing in these two experiments led to nonmonotonic performance functions.    
Encoding variability theory cannot explain any drop in performance when lag is increased or 
when the relationship between item presentations is decreased.  That is, encoding variability 
implies that performance will always continue to increase or asymptote with spacing.  These 
results clearly reveal that this is not the case.  
Reminding theory can explain findings that other well established spacing theories, such 
as encoding variability, cannot (Benjamin & Tullis, 2010).  The idea is that, rather than encoding 
both instances of the item separately, the second instance may remind the learner of seeing it the 
first time.  The reminding thus causes either an enhancement of the strength of the original 
representation or lays down a new representation.  This use of reminding, it should be noted, 
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suggests a more interactive relation between encoding and retrieval than much traditional 
memory research.  This interactive perspective forms a natural way of understanding why 
spacing functions are often nonmonotonic—performance reflects a trade-off between the 
conditions that enhance the effects of reminding (substantial forgetting or weak reminding cues) 
and those that enhance the probability of reminding (temporal proximity and strong cues).   
 
The current studies 
Given the importance of remindings in so many domains of cognition, one expects they 
also play a role in higher-level, integrative processes, such as understanding and interpretation.  
Note that, in all the varied research I have gone over here, there has been little emphasis on how 
a reminding activated by some stimulus might influence understanding of that stimulus at a basic 
level.  For instance, when solving a new problem, reminding may bring to mind a relevant 
analog, but little research has investigated how reminding shapes the initial representation of the 
problem.  Similarly, the role of reminding has been studied in classifying new category 
members, as well as making generalizations about a category.  And some research (Spalding & 
Ross, 2000) has shown that reminding learners of previously seen category exemplars can 
influence the abstract interpretation of a new category member’s given features. For instance, 
reminding can bias whether the given feature “rides a bike to work” is indicative of athleticism 
or of environmental concern in a person. But little research has addressed whether reminding can 
influence basic interpretation of category features, as in Medin and Wisniewski (1994), who 
show that activating category expectations can lead people to interpret the same physical 
stimulus (a vertical line of dots on a drawing of a person) as a different feature (buttons or a tie).  
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Reminding may be one mechanism that activates such expectations in real-world category 
learning.  
 Understanding can be thought of as operating in stages, as learners continuously build 
larger, more integrated representations from smaller pieces of information.  For text 
comprehension, word interpretation is an early stage, while comprehension of sentences and 
longer blocks of text, as well as understanding thematic elements, come later.  By focusing on 
the effect of remindings on the use of material, rather than on understanding it at a basic level, 
much research has also failed to address early stages of processing.   
This can be seen by examining a previous example -- how reminding can influence the 
inference of abstract category features from given features.  In order to make the determination 
that “rides a bike to work” indicates athleticism, a reader has to construct an integrated 
representation that combines the meaning of each word into an understanding of the sentence.  
Only after understanding the sentence as a whole can it bring to mind another individual who 
also rides a bike to work. If this reminded-of individual is athletic, then it is more likely the 
present one’s actions will be interpreted as athletic.  Thus, reminding at the sentence level acts to 
bias abstract feature interpretation.  If reminding can affect processing at the level of individual 
words, it would show their influence at an earlier stage.  
More importantly, by eschewing a focus on understanding, previous reminding research 
has avoided the study of quick, non-deliberative processes, such as word interpretation.  The 
fluency displayed by most readers shows that word interpretation occurs very quickly.  It is not 
clear that remindings can have any effect on so quick a process – perhaps words are interpreted 
much more quickly than remindings occur.  If so, quick ambiguity resolution may not be 
amenable to influence by specific earlier events, but only by more general knowledge and the 
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current context.  This restriction may prevent some potentially non-normative behavior, as when 
recent experiences have disproportionately high influence, at the cost of performing worse in 
situations where specific experiences are more relevant than erroneous or incomplete general 
knowledge. 
There has been some empirical support for a role of reminding in the understanding of 
new material, though at a passage rather than word level.  Ross and Bradshaw (1994) had 
subjects read three stories. The first two were “source” stories, with the first about a retiring 
reporter reminiscing on the time he covered a jailbreak, and the second about an eccentric who 
enjoyed watching wrestling on television.  The third was an ambiguous story that could be 
interpreted as being about a jailbreak or about a wrestling match.  Each subject saw a superficial 
cue (“Delaware Daily newspaper” or “Shakespeare”) in the beginning of the ambiguous story, 
which was originally mentioned in either the jailbreak or the wrestling source story.  Despite the 
superficiality of the cues used, a single reminding of the earlier story was enough to bias 
interpretation of the ambiguous story.  Our goal, in a similar vein, is to extend the research on 
reminding to include interpretation and understanding of material at a basic level, and at early 
and quick stages of processing, not just the use of it. 
Our experiments evaluate the interpretation of ambiguous homographs by asking subjects 
to write sentences including those words.  To evaluate the effects of reminding, visual 
background contexts were varied across the stimuli, such that some homographs were preceded 
by a biasing word presented on either the same or a different background context.  The presence 
of reminding was evaluated by assessing the biasing effect of prior words presented on similar 
and dissimilar contexts relative to a baseline control condition.   
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Specifically, participants were shown a list of words (including homographs) with 
background images, and asked to write a sentence using the word.  Prior to the sentence 
generation, they were asked to evaluate whether they had previously viewed that particular 
background or not, in an attempt to motivate thinking back to prior episodes in the experiment.  
Each homograph in the list was paired with a cue word, spaced 3 list positions away, that was 
semantically related to the homograph’s less dominant meaning (e.g., the homograph shot and 
the cue whiskey).  In the same condition, the cue word appeared before the homograph with the 
same background image.  In the different condition, the cue word still appeared before the 
homograph, but with a different background image.  Finally, in the reverse condition, which 
served as a baseline control, the homograph appeared before the cue word.  
My predictions for the three conditions assume that remindings can influence 
understanding even for relatively quick processes, such as word interpretation.   More 
specifically, semantically relevant cue words, brought to mind via the repetition of background 
images, will bias the interpretation of a consequent homograph.  The same condition should thus 
show the highest rate of non-dominant homograph interpretation, showing the influence of 
thinking back to the nearby cue words.  The different condition, where backgrounds should not 
elicit any semantically relevant reminding but nearby cues are still available to bias interpretation 
via priming, should show a lower rate. Finally, the reverse condition should show the lowest rate 
because placing the cues after the homographs precludes any influence they might have on 
homograph interpretation. Word recognition performance should also be better for conditions 
with more remindings between members of a critical pair, since remindings constitute rehearsal 
of one or both items. 
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EXPERIMENT 1 
 
Method 
Subjects 
43 University of Illinois undergraduates participated for course credit. However, 
seventeen subjects’ data were discarded, either because they did not finish in time (14) or for 
failure to follow instructions (3).  One subject did not complete the recognition test, so only the 
word list data were used.  All experimental sessions lasted 50 minutes or less. 
 
Design 
A within-subjects design was used, with each subject exposed to fourteen critical (cue-
homograph) pairs for each condition.  When assigning each pair to a condition, the conditions 
were spread across the whole list, rather than blocking all trials of a condition together.  The 
order by which conditions were spread was counterbalanced using a 3x3 Latin square, resulting 
in three word list orders.  List order served as a between-subjects variable, with each subject 
seeing one of the three list orders. 
The main dependent variable was the proportion of homographs that were interpreted as 
their normatively less dominant meaning.  The same condition was expected to show the highest 
proportion of non-dominant interpretation, due to semantic (cue) and contextual (background) 
reminding.  The different condition, where only semantic reminding was possible, was expected 
to show a lower proportion.  The reverse condition provides a baseline rate at which the non-
dominant interpretation is provided.  Two dependent variables of secondary interest are the 
proportion of non-dominant homograph interpretations contingent on background recognition 
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response in the word list phase, and the proportion of recognized cues and homographs on the 
final recognition test.  
 
Materials 
Forty-two homographs were chosen for which one meaning was dominant (occurring 
more often than other meanings, usually by a great margin) according to free association norms 
(Twilley, et.al., 1994). The dominant meanings occurred between forty and ninety-eight percent 
of the time, with a mean of seventy-one percent.  The non-dominant meanings occurred between 
one and forty percent of the time, with a mean of nineteen percent.  For instance, when asked the 
first word that comes to mind after hearing “punch,” 52% of responses were related to striking 
things with one’s fist, the dominant meaning.  Only 30% of responses related to fruit punch, a 
non-dominant meaning.  The norms were then used to choose the cue most associated with a 
non-dominant meaning of each homograph.  In this case, bowl was chosen as the cue for the 
homograph punch.  Forty-two critical cue-homograph word pairs were thus obtained (see 
Appendix).  Due to a programming error, for one critical pair, a cue related to the dominant 
meaning were used.  However, since this cue was used across all conditions, it affects only the 
item variability and not the overall effect of condition. Additionally, one critical pair did not 
switch properly between experimental conditions, and its data were discarded. 
Word-list presentation. Background images were distinctive images that were found via 
internet searches.  They included nature scenes, animals, buildings, food, statues, and musical 
instruments.  Even when multiple pictures included the same categorical content (i.e., two nature 
pictures), they differed in color, composition, and so on.  
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    For each list order, the same 113 words were presented: 42 critical pairs, four primacy 
buffer words, three recency buffer words, and 22 filler words.  To control for order effects, all 42 
homographs remained in the same list position for all three list orders.  However, depending on 
condition, a homograph’s semantically related cue word might be three list positions before 
(same or different) or three list positions after (reverse).  Filler words were inserted into the list 
in order to better disguise the semantic relationships among the critical stimuli.   
For all three list orders, each word was randomly assigned a background image, with the 
following constraints: 1) the members of each critical pair in the ‘same’ and ‘reverse’ conditions 
shared the same background image, 2) critical pairs in the ‘different’ condition had different 
background images, and 3) all background images appeared twice.  Each of the three list orders 
included the same fifty-seven backgrounds, though presented in a different order.  
Recognition test. Additionally, a single 168-word list was compiled for the word-
recognition phase.  The recognition list included all 84 words from the experiment’s 42 critical 
pairs, as well as 84 new words.  The new words were selected for being common English words 
of one to three syllables, characteristics shared by nearly all of the homographs and cue words.  
The order of items in the recognition list was randomized, and this same order was used for all 
participants, regardless of which word-background list order they saw earlier. 
 
 Procedure 
 The experiment consisted of two phases: the word list phase and the recognition test. 
Word List.  The participants were instructed that they would be shown a series of words 
with background pictures, one at a time.  They were told that a good way to remember each word 
is to write a sentence using the word’s meaning.  They were instructed to type such a sentence 
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after each word, and were informed that they would be asked some questions about the 
backgrounds. 
  The background image for each word-background pair was shown first.  The question, 
“Have you seen this background before? y/n” was superimposed over the image in size 12 font in 
the center of the screen.  Once participants responded by pressing the “y” or “n” key, the 
question disappeared, leaving only the background image.  The image was displayed for 4 
seconds, then the word appeared in the center of the screen in size 48 font (see Fig 1).  After 2.5 
seconds, the word/image pair was replaced by a blank white screen.  The subject then typed a 
sentence that included the word and pressed enter to indicate completion.  After all 113 word-
background pairs had been shown, participants were congratulated on finishing phase one of the 
experiment, and told to press any key to advance to phase two. 
Recognition Test.  Participants were instructed that they would again be shown a series of 
words, one word at a time.  Their task was to indicate whether they had seen the word earlier in 
the experiment by pressing y (for yes) or n (for no).  They were asked to press any key to begin 
the task.  The words were shown in size 48 black font on a white background. 
 
Results 
Homograph Interpretation Results.  The homograph interpretation data are summarized 
in Figure 2.  There was a significant main effect for reminding condition, showing that 
homograph word interpretation was biased by the presence of visual or semantic cues, F(2, 46) = 
14.51, p < .001.  Follow-up tests were performed comparing the means of the three experimental 
conditions.  As predicted, the same condition showed a greater proportion of nondominant 
interpretation than both the different condition, t(25) = 5.47, p <  .001, and the baseline reverse 
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condition, t(25) = 2.88, p = .024.  The difference between the different and reverse conditions 
was significant, though in the opposite direction from that expected, t(25) = 2.61, p =.045.  In all 
three cases, Type I error was controlled using the Bonferroni correction.  There was no main 
effect for the counterbalancing variable of list order, F(2, 23) = .654, p = .529.   
However, there was a significant interaction between reminding condition and list order, 
F(4, 46) = 3.156, p = .022.  The simple main effect of reminding condition was assessed for list 
order.  There was a significant effect for reminding condition for two of the list orders, but not 
the third.  The latter showed the same decrease in the different condition relative to baseline, but 
did not show a difference between the same and reverse conditions. As a whole, these results 
suggest strong item effects and other methodological issues (see discussion). 
Homograph interpretation rates contingent on background recognition response were also 
tabulated (see Table 1).  Because many subjects did not contribute a score to some of the cells in 
this comparison, no inferential statistics were performed.  However, the values from this analysis 
support the view that reminding is the mechanism by which understanding was influenced: Bias 
was much greater in the same condition following correct recognition of a previously seen 
background than failed recognition. 
 Word Recognition Results.  Word recognition performance on the final test is shown in 
Figure 3.  There was a significant main effect for condition, F(2, 48) = 3.217, p = .049.  Pairwise 
comparisons were made with all three possible pairs of conditions, with Type I error controlled 
using the Bonferroni correction.  Only the difference between the different and reverse 
conditions was significant, t(24) = 2.71, p = .037, with reverse showing a higher hit rate.  This 
pattern mirrors the unexpected difference seen in the interpretation data. 
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 I also tested whether word recognition performance differed between the first- and 
second-presented items in a critical pair.  Figure 4 breaks down word recognition performance 
by type of word (cue or homograph) in each condition.  For both same and different conditions, 
the first-presented item was the cue word, and the second-presented item was the homograph. In 
the reverse condition, the order was reversed. There was no main effect for presentation order, 
F(1, 24) = .286, p = .598. 
 
Discussion 
The differences in word interpretation between reminding conditions show that the 
presence of semantic and visual (background image) cues do have an impact on word 
interpretation.  Critically, the repetition of background image, which should have increased the 
degree to which subjects successfully “looked back” at the relevant previous event, led to 
substantially more bias in interpretation than any other condition.  
An examination of the differences between conditions shows that reminding elicited by 
repeated background images is the likely cause of the interpretation bias.  The reverse condition 
serves as a baseline by placing the cue word after its related homograph, so that thinking back to 
the cue at time of homograph interpretation is impossible.  The higher bias in the same condition 
is in the direction of the cued meaning, so the cue word must be exerting some influence over 
interpretation.  However, it cannot be that the mere presence of the cue word (say, by priming), 
rather than thinking back to the cue at time of homograph presentation, is responsible for this 
effect.  The different condition shows this by placing the cue first, but with a different 
background as the later homograph, resulting in reliably lower rates of non-dominant 
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interpretation.  This shows that the mere presence of a preceding cue word (without visual 
reminding cues) is not responsible for the effect.   
If reminding is responsible, one would also expect that not recognizing an already seen 
background would lead to lower interpretation bias, since it implies that the subject did not think 
back to an earlier background (and thus was not reminded of the earlier cue word).  This is 
consistent with the data shown in Table 1, which shows that non-dominant interpretation rates 
were much higher when the background was correctly recognized as having been seen before 
than when it was incorrectly classified as new.    
 
Explaining the different condition 
 The lower than baseline rate of nondominant homograph interpretation in the different 
condition was puzzling. I expected that these homographs would show an intermediate level of 
nondominant interpretation. The biasing cue-word was presented first, allowing residual 
semantic activation from cue-word presentation to affect processing of the later homograph. But 
without a repeated background, homographs would lack contextual cues for retrieval of and 
additional influence by the earlier biasing word.   Thus, homograph interpretation in the different 
condition should have only been influenced by semantic priming, not by reminding. 
 This effect is likely an artifact, rather than a true difference.  To understand why, consider 
how counterbalancing the assignment of critical pairs to conditions was accomplished in this 
experiment. Homographs remained in the same list position regardless of what condition they 
were assigned to.  So list order primarily controlled the order in which conditions were assigned 
to the given homographs (and thus, where their respective cue words were placed.)  For every list 
order, each condition was experienced once before any of them were repeated, using a constant 
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pattern particular to that list order.  For instance, for list order 1, the pattern was same-different-
reverse. The first homograph was assigned to the same condition, the second to the different 
condition, the third to the reverse condition, the fourth to the same condition again, and so on.  
Each list order used a different permutation of this pattern. Using this repetitive scheme, rather 
than randomly assigning conditions, was necessary to ensure collection of enough observations 
in each condition.  A random scheme would have necessitated a much longer list of words to 
prevent list position conflicts between critical pairs.  
The consequence of this counterbalancing scheme is that the forty-two critical pairs were 
effectively divided into three sets of fourteen, and the words in each set stayed together as they 
were shuffled between conditions depending on list order.  Two main problems thus become 
apparent, each of which may partially mediate the different effect.  First, the cohesive sets of 
homographs seem to have widely varying base rates of nondominant homograph interpretation, a 
problem exacerbated by the unequal number of subjects in each list order.  Second, there was a 
significant interaction between reminding condition and list order, possibly indicating that the 
influence of a particular condition on homograph interpretation depended on which set of critical 
pairs were being tested.   
The best estimate of a homograph set’s baseline rate of nondominant interpretation is 
likely its performance in the reverse condition. Reverse condition homographs are untainted by 
any influence of their semantically related cue words, which occur after. Here I break down 
reverse performance by cohesive sets of homographs. I arbitrarily refer to these sets of 
homographs as Groups 1, 2, and 3.  There is some variance between these groups: Group 1 (M = 
0.184) showed the lowest performance, Group 3 (M = 0.305) the highest, and Group 2 about 
halfway between (0.246).     
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More important than these baseline differences is the significant interaction between 
reminding condition and list order. It seems that, even if the direction of each manipulation’s 
effects remains constant, its magnitude changes.  Some groups of homographs may receive more 
of a boost in the same condition than others.  Conversely, some homographs show a stronger 
decrease from baseline when placed in the different condition. Group 1 had the distinction of 
both having the lowest baseline rates of nondominant homograph interpretation, and showing the 
greatest decrease when placed in the different condition.  
Selection effects may have helped Group 1 skew the results. Nearly a third of participants 
were excluded for failing to finish in time.  One consequence was an unequal number of subjects 
between list orders.  In fact, the list order which overwhelmingly showed the different condition 
decrease (by virtue of placing Group 1 in the different condition) also had the most participants 
(see Table 2).  Unweighted means, which count each list order equally, reduce the discrepancy. 
See Table 3, which compares weighted and unweighted means of nondominant homograph 
interpretation. 
The data suggest the results were skewed by differing base rates of nondominant 
interpretation between the groups of homographs. Although free association norms were 
originally used to select groups of homographs with similar base rates, the norms may be out of 
date or may not apply to undergraduates in this region. 
Although the preceding explanation seems the strongest case to explain the low different 
performance, other elements of the experiment may have exacerbated this effect. The assumption 
that the different condition prevented remindings may be mistaken. Although homographs in this 
condition never shared a background image with their biasing cue words, they sometimes shared 
a background image with a previously seen word from another critical pair. In these cases, a 
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homograph’s interpretation might have been biased by these earlier words, even though they 
were not specifically chosen for their relevance to the homograph  While the influence of such 
unintended remindings seems unlikely, it is nonetheless a confound addressed in Experiment 2.    
 
Word Recognition 
The effects of background-elicited reminding should also be evident in the word 
recognition phase.  Reminding can potentially increase memory of a critical pair by simply 
acting to rehearse each item of the pair again.  The benefit may be even greater if subjects notice 
a meaningful connection between the two words, such as their semantic relation.  
Background-elicited remindings should be equally likely in the same and reverse 
conditions.  Both conditions used the same background image for the two words of a critical pair 
– the only difference was whether the cue or the homograph appeared first.   Participants might 
also experience word-elicited remindings, in which a word’s meaning brings to mind an earlier, 
related word (most likely the other member of its critical pair). The relative likelihood of word-
elicited remindings between cue-first (same and different) or homograph-first (reverse) pairs is 
difficult to guess because the free-association norms were unidirectional, only showing how 
often a homograph elicits associates of a particular meaning.  Thus, we expect that word 
recognition is roughly equal in the same and reverse conditions, reflecting background-elicited 
reminding between members of a critical pair, and that both show higher hit rates than the 
different condition, in which there is no such reminding.   
Word recognition performance did, in fact, show evidence of differential reminding 
between conditions.  Recognition performance for words from the same and reverse conditions 
was roughly equal (M = .849 and M = .855, respectively).  Both also showed greater 
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performance than different words (M = .817), though this difference was only reliable for the 
reverse condition.  This pattern of results, though ambiguous, is consistent with my prediction 
that background-elicited remindings should strengthen memory for both items in a critical pair.  
It is true, however, that the same condition alone fails to reach statistical significance when 
compared with different, which seems counter to this interpretation.  A potential explanation is 
that word-elicited remindings are more likely from a cue to an earlier homograph than vice versa, 
and that the combined influence of both kinds of reminding lent an advantage for reverse words 
that was not present for same words. To evaluate this possibility, I needed a measure of the 
associative strength both from cue to homograph and from homograph to cue. As a stand-in for 
associative strength I measured how often recalling a homograph led to recalling its associated 
cue, and vice versa. For example, to determine homograph-to-cue associative strength in the free 
recall data, first I tallied the number of times a homograph appeared as the first member of a 
critical pair, regardless of what words were or were not recalled later.  For convenience, I'll call 
this count "first-recalls."  Then I tallied the proportion of first-recalls for which the related cue 
word in that critical pair was later recalled. If cue to homograph reminding is more likely, then 
cue recalls should be followed by homograph recalls more often than homograph recalls are 
followed by cue recalls.  This turned out not to be the case: cue-to-homograph associative 
strength (M = 0.372) was not significantly different from homograph-to-cue associative strength 
(M = 0.438), t(60) = 1.443, p = .154. 
An alternative explanation is that remindings did not strengthen memory for any of the 
words, regardless of condition.  On this view, the lower word recognition performance for 
different condition words is not real, but may be an artifact brought about by some of the factors 
responsible for the similarly puzzling homograph interpretation results.  Remindings may not 
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have helped if the task was easy enough that performance had little room for improvement – a 
possibility consistent with the extremely good performance displayed (see Figs. 4 and 5).  
A finer-grained prediction for the word recognition phase is suggested by Appleton-
Knapp, Bjork, and Wickens (2007).  As they point out, when reminding occurs between two 
related items, the order in which the items are presented may lead to differential encoding, 
resulting in different later memory performance.  Specifically, if viewing the second of a pair of 
items brings to mind the first item, then this reminding acts to encode the first item a second time 
while detracting mental resources from the second item’s encoding process.  This view predicts 
that the first-presented item in a pair should be better remembered later.  This was not the case in 
the present experiment: presentation order for items in a critical pair did not significantly predict 
later recognition performance.  If reminding does affect recognition performance on the whole, 
this non-effect may indicate that both items are strengthened evenly by the reminding process.  
This makes intuitive sense if some of the memory benefit from reminding arises from the learner 
comparing both items and noticing their semantic relation.  The latter possibility would agree 
with much memory research in showing that meaningful information is better remembered.  
Future work may test whether any such explicit comparison between reminded items occur, 
perhaps by testing for schema induction or false memory effects (i.e., will eliciting a reminding 
between the words “punch” and “bowl” increase the rate at which “drink” is later incorrectly 
remembered?) 
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EXPERIMENT 2 
Experiment 2 had two main goals. The first goal was to confirm that remindings elicited 
by repeated background images do bias ambiguous homograph interpretation.  The second goal 
was to discover if the anomalous different condition performance was a true effect or a 
consequence of methodological issues. 
Experiment 2 addresses several methodological issues, some of which may have 
contributed to the low different performance, and some that are improvements more generally. 
First, to ensure that interpretation bias reflected reminding condition rather than item differences, 
groups of homographs were equated based on empirical base rates from Experiment 1 – the 
average rate, for each homograph, of nondominant interpretation across conditions. To ensure a 
higher completion rate, I reduced the number of critical word pairs per condition from fourteen 
to eight, replaced the word recognition test with a shorter free recall test, and removed the 
primacy and recency buffers, which were no longer needed. Finally, every background in the 
different condition now appears only once, hopefully preventing accidental background-elicited 
remindings 
 
Method 
Subjects 
61 University of Illinois undergraduates participated for course credit. However, three 
subjects’ data were discarded for failure to follow instructions. All experimental sessions lasted 
50 minutes or less. 
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Design 
A within-subjects design was used, with each subject exposed to eight critical (cue-
homograph) pairs for each condition.  The method by which experimental conditions were 
counterbalanced was the same as in the first experiment.  
Experiment 2 used the same task as the first experiment during word list presentation.  
Therefore the main dependent measure of interest, and its relevant predictions, applies here. The 
main dependent variable was the proportion of homographs that were interpreted as their 
normatively less dominant meaning.  The same condition was expected to show the highest 
proportion of non-dominant interpretation, due to semantic (cue) and contextual (background) 
reminding.  The different condition, where only semantic reminding was possible, was expected 
to show a lower proportion.  The reverse condition provides a baseline rate at which the non-
dominant interpretation is provided.  A dependent variable of secondary interest is the proportion 
of non-dominant homograph interpretations contingent on background recognition response in 
the word list phase.  
Experiment 2 used a free recall test, rather than recognition, to assess memory for cues 
and homographs.  Two dependent variables of interest here were the proportion of words (both 
cues and homographs) recalled from each condition, and the proportion of complete pairs 
recalled from each condition. 
 
Materials 
Twenty-four homographs were chosen out of the original set of forty-two used in the first 
experiment. These twenty-four were selected because they showed the highest rates of non-
dominant interpretation in the first experiment. This selection criteria was an attempt to prevent 
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floor effects, where some interpretations would be so uncommon that they would never occur at 
all. Additionally, the empirically obtained interpretation rates were roughly equal between the 
groups of homographs used for each condition.  Each homograph was paired with the same cue 
word as in Experiment 1.  Twenty-four critical cue-homograph word pairs were thus obtained 
(see Appendix).   
Word-list presentation. Background images were a subset of those used in the first 
experiment. As before, they included nature scenes, animals, buildings, food, statues, and 
musical instruments.  Even when multiple pictures depicted the same categorical content (i.e., 
two nature pictures), they differed in color, composition, and so on.  
    Each subject received one of three list orders.  For each list order, the same 65 words 
were presented: 24 critical pairs and 17 filler words.  To control for order effects, all 24 
homographs remained in the same list position for all three list orders.  However, depending on 
condition, a homograph’s semantically related cue word might be three list positions before 
(same or different) or three list positions after (reverse).  Filler words were inserted into the list 
in order to better disguise the semantic relationships among the critical stimuli.   
For every subject, each word was randomly assigned a background image, with the 
following constraints: 1) the members of each critical pair in the same and reverse conditions 
shared the same background image, 2) critical pairs in the different condition had different 
background images, and 3) each background image used in the different condition or for filler 
words appeared only once.  Each subject saw the same forty-nine backgrounds, though presented 
in a different order.  
Free recall test. An untimed free recall test followed the word-list presentation.  Subjects 
were asked to recall as many of the just-presented words as possible. 
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Results 
Homograph Interpretation Results.  The homograph interpretation data are summarized 
in Figure 5.  There was a significant main effect for reminding condition, showing that 
homograph word interpretation was biased by the presence of visual or semantic cues, F(2, 110) 
= 9.89, p < .001.  Follow-up tests were performed comparing the means of the three 
experimental conditions.  The difference between same and different conditions was significant, 
t(57) = 2.84, p =  .006. The difference between the same and reverse conditions was also 
significant, t(57) = 4.15, p < .001.  The difference between the different and reverse conditions 
was not significant,  t(57) = .979, p =.332.  In all three cases, Type I error was controlled using 
the Bonferroni correction.  No main effect for the counterbalancing variable of list order was 
found, F(2, 55) = .225, p = .799.  Additionally, no interaction between reminding condition and 
list order was found,  F(2, 55) = 2.52, p = .09. 
Homograph interpretation rates contingent on background recognition response were also 
tabulated (see Table 4).  The prediction that correct “yes” responses in the ‘same’ condition 
should lead to higher rates of nondominant interpretations is not borne out here.  However, 
because many subjects did not contribute a score to some of the cells in this comparison, no 
inferential statistics were performed.  The same condition bias is a result of background-elicited 
remindings. Thus, within the same condition, we should expect bias only when the participant 
correctly recognizes a background as having been seen before. For backgrounds incorrectly 
classified as new, on the other hand, homograph interpretation should mirror the different 
condition results.  In this case, performance was too close to ceiling to test this prediction – 
future experiments with less powerful retrieval cues or more difficult memory tasks may allow 
us to test this prediction. 
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Free Recall Results.  Free recall performance on the final test is shown in Figure 6.  
There was a significant main effect for condition, F(2, 59) = 15.809, p < .001.  Pairwise 
comparisons were made with all three possible pairs of conditions. Type I error was controlled 
using the Bonferroni correction, resulting in an adjusted alpha level of 0.0167 for each test.  
There was no difference in word recall between the same and reverse conditions, t(60) = 2.301, p 
= .075. However, the same condition showed higher recall than different, t(60) = 5.579, p <.001, 
as did reverse, t(60) = 3.225, p = .006.  
 
Discussion 
The second experiment again supported my primary prediction – that repeating a 
distinctive background image would cause subjects to “look back” to its first occurrence, and 
information activated by this reminding would bias homograph interpretation. Furthermore, the 
puzzling effect from Experiment 1, that the rate of nondominant interpretation was unusually low 
in the different condition, disappeared when several confounds (unequal n between conditions 
and other methodological issues) were eliminated for Experiment 2. Interestingly, this resulted in 
different performance that was no different than baseline. That is, homograph interpretation was 
not biased by a semantically relevant cue word preceding it when lacking a repeated background 
image to activate the earlier word.  While contrary to my initial predictions, this result has no 
bearing on the importance of remindings in the experiment – it only shows that semantic priming 
alone did not influence homograph interpretation. On the whole, the results support the idea that 
the relevant information activated by remindings has a much deeper and more basic influence 
than previously thought. 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The purpose of these experiments was to determine whether the potentially useful 
information activated by remindings can influence the basic understanding of new information. I 
evaluated whether reminding can influence even the fast, non-deliberative determination of word 
meaning.  Specifically, I tested whether exposure to semantic or visual cues prior to semantically 
ambiguous homographs could influence their interpretation.  
 Whether such remindings can influence the resolution of lexical ambiguity was an open 
question.  In the ordinary course of language comprehension, we are frequently unaware of a 
word’s multiple possible meanings (e.g., Yates, 1978; Dixon and Twilley, 1999).  Our fluency in 
writing and speaking is partly a result of quick, seemingly automatic resolution of lexical 
ambiguity (allowing phenomena such as garden path sentences to arise).  This resolution acts 
quickly enough to preclude our conscious awareness of it.  Because remindings had not yet been 
shown to influence such early, seemingly automatic processes, our predictions were based on 
experimenter intuition that this was possible. 
 This discussion will focus on three main points.  First, these findings are likely to 
generalize to a broad range of psychological contexts and experimental paradigms, though 
special attention is given to how reminding might influence resolution of perceptual ambiguity 
(i.e., visual, auditory).  Second, implications of the present experiments on more naturalistic or 
contextually rich situations are considered. Finally, I address implications for category learning, 
as well as potential limitations of these experiments.  
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Resolving perceptual ambiguity 
Given memory’s associative nature and the intuitive prevalence of remindings, it would 
be interesting to explore their effects in the many other cases of ambiguity that we regularly 
experience. Take auditory ambiguity, for example – information directly from the speech stream 
is often ambiguous. Phonemes are pronounced differently by different speakers or in different 
situations, or noisy conditions (say, on a cell phone call with poor reception) obscure 
information. Your understanding of what a word means (or even what word it was in the first 
place) might change as a result of reminding. Maybe you’d think a man with a deep, booming 
voice who talks about “training” and “practice” is more likely discussing pedagogy than sports 
training, if he sounds like a favorite professor. On a more serious note, you may be more likely 
to take umbrage at a rude comment by a passerby if that person superficially resembles someone 
you dislike. Presumably, any distinctive characteristic of a speaker, regardless of sensory 
modality, could trigger remindings that color your interpretation of their words.  
There are also interesting implications for eyewitness testimony and police work, areas 
where the resolution of perceptual ambiguity is critically important. A witness may see a crime 
in progress in conditions of less than perfect visibility – would being reminded of similar earlier 
instances affect what he sees? The criminal might have a mane of red hair that brings to mind an 
aggressive classmate the witness once knew. He may now be more likely to call the criminal’s 
actions aggressive, or see the ambiguous object the criminal carries as a gun rather than a 
flashlight. Police officers assessing a potential threat may be likewise influenced. Of course, it is 
likely that, most of the time, when these remindings influence understanding they are useful and 
correct. But, as the present experiments demonstrate, particularly unusual and salient memory 
cues may disproportionately and inappropriately influence how a given ambiguity is resolved. 
 28 
 
Generalizing to Richer Contexts: Multiple Remindings 
One potentially unrealistic constraint of the present experiments is that only a single 
earlier experience (i.e., the semantically related cue word) was brought to mind.  In less artificial 
environments, a single retrieval cue might elicit several past experiences, or several retrieval 
cues might each be available to trigger reminding. We can examine the same process used here, 
that of lexical ambiguity resolution, and how it might be affected by multiple remindings. 
First, I make a simplifying assumption that biasing words influence ambiguous 
homograph interpretation in a manner consistent with semantic networks, in particular those 
based on spreading activation (e.g., Collins and Loftus, 1975; Neely, 1977).  Reminding back to 
a semantic cue word activates that word or concept, and activation spreads to related words.  The 
cue word’s activation makes one particular meaning of a homograph more available, and a given 
word is more likely to be recognized in terms of that meaning.  
Note that this view assumes that word interpretation is biased implicitly.  Although a 
conscious experience (i.e., a recollection of seeing the earlier related word) may accompany this 
activation, only the former’s influence is considered here.  This focus on implicit aspects of 
reminding is based on the idea that lexical ambiguity resolution is itself relatively automatic and 
nonconscious; a focus on the explicit aspects of reminding might be more relevant when dealing 
with processes that are themselves relatively deliberative and explicit (e.g., solving a puzzling 
problem by reference to an earlier one). 
One possibility is that, when paired with more than one salient retrieval cue, multiple 
remindings become active at once to jointly influence ambiguity resolution. Suppose that in 
addition to background images, I introduce distinctive fonts and font colors.  At the time of 
homograph presentation, I can display unique values on all three cues, potentially eliciting 
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reminding for three previously seen related words.  Multiple remindings, in terms of spreading 
activation, would entail activation converging from each reminded item onto the homograph 
meaning I choose to cue. For example, bringing both ‘travel’ and ‘vacation’ to mind (with 
cursive font and bright blue text)  will make ‘lobby’ seem more like a hotel lobby than ‘travel’ 
alone.   
If word interpretation in the preceding scenario is truly biased by multiple remindings, 
the effect should also be apparent in a later memory test.  The prediction is that if multiple 
conceptually related items are brought to mind sometime after their initial presentation, false 
alarms to conceptually related words are more likely.  For example, if I use salient contextual 
cues to remind participants of  the words ‘bed’, ‘dream’, and ‘pillow’ after their initial 
presentations, they should more often falsely recall ‘sleep’ than if they only saw those words 
once but without later reminding.  This is essentially the reminding homolog of the DRM false 
memory effect, which shows that presenting many related words in a single list can cause false 
alarms to a highly associated concept (e.g., Roediger and McDermott, 1995.) 
On the other hand, memory capacity limits may reduce the influence of multiple 
concurrent remindings.  Remindings may be limited in the number of previous episodes, the 
amount of information from each episode, or both.  Such limits are implemented in spreading 
activation models by limiting the total amount of concurrent activation.  Therefore, as the 
number of potential remindings increase, their effects on quick processes like lexical ambiguity 
resolution will fail to scale linearly. In other words, four potential remindings are not necessarily 
twice as influential as two potential remindings.  
Finally, the early influence of remindings on homograph interpretation enlarges the scope of 
what can be considered context when resolving ambiguity. Context is not limited to the 
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environment and mental states co-occurring with the stimulus.  It also includes knowledge that is 
episodically linked.  The principles of memory which govern successful retrieval – 
distinctiveness, recency, and so on – presumably guide the availability of this information.  This 
suggests a line of research aimed at discovering when this fact proves useful and when it proves 
harmful.   
 
Implications for Category Learning 
Like word meaning, the features we predicate about objects are potentially ambiguous, 
though we may resolve this ambiguity quickly and below awareness. Features are potentially 
ambiguous at an abstract level – for instance, suppose a teenager named Roger always helps his 
neighbors carry groceries. There are several abstract features that Roger’s actions are consistent 
with: “helpful,” “attention-seeking,” “responsible,” etc.  Featural ambiguity might also exist at a 
more basic level – for instance, the tray that slides out of my computer tower might be a DVD 
drive or a cupholder.  More generally, the point is that category features are not necessarily 
given, but may be determined by the learner (Spalding and Ross, 2000).  Most models of 
category learning, however, concentrate on learning regularities about the features without 
addressing how the features are determined.   
Consistent with the theme of the present experiments, I now concentrate on how featural 
ambiguity on the level of basic understanding or even perception is resolved.  Top-down 
influences in the form of intuitive theories or schemas seem to play an important role in this 
process (Brewer and Lambert, 1993). Medin and Wisniewski (1994), for example, showed that 
activating category expectations can lead people to interpret the same physical stimulus as a 
different physical feature.  One group of participants was shown drawings made by either “farm 
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or city kids,” and another group was shown the same drawings made by either “creative or 
uncreative kids.”   A participant might interpret a vertical line of dots as buttons if he expected 
detail (a drawing by a creative child) or as a tie if he expected sophistication (a drawing by a city 
child).  
Being reminded of earlier similar items or events may be one mechanism for such top-
down influences in category learning.  This idea could be tested with a simple modification of 
Medin and Wisniewski’s materials.  Before seeing an ambiguous picture, participants could read 
a passage that activates particular category expectations – for instance, a story about a creative 
young painter who lives in a loft in New York City.  The passage would include some salient but 
incidental characteristics – it could be written in an unusual cursive font, or make mention of 
watermelons.  Repeating the unusual font or watermelons along with the ambiguous picture 
should increase the likelihood of perceiving “creative” physical features.  Such salient cues 
would play the same role as the repeated background images in the present homograph 
experiments -- they would bring to mind specific recent items and the expectations with which 
they are associated.  
The influence on basic understanding of specific earlier events, rather than general 
category or schema information, might be particularly useful when little to no general 
information is available. This might be the case when first learning novel categories, or when 
encountering an object which is difficult to classify by virtue of difficult to interpret features.  
This may explain some ordering effects in category learning – initial examples may derive some 
of their extra influence by biasing what features are predicated for later items. 
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Problems and Limitations 
 One might argue that the task in the present experiments did not truly measure automatic 
or very fast processes.  While lexical ambiguity resolution is one such process, we have only a 
surrogate measure of it – the sentences participants wrote with each word shortly after its 
presentation.  We have no assurances here that only participants’ initial understanding of the 
word was influenced.  It is possible, on the contrary, that reminding to an earlier related word 
merely biases how the current word will be used in a sentence, but not its initial understanding.  
Participants might have noticed an ambiguity and consciously chosen a meaning to write about, 
and remindings might have affected this later revision process rather than the initial 
determination of word meaning. These criticisms can be addressed in future experiments by 
using implicit measures to more directly assess whether it is the initial, quick determination of 
meaning, rather than some conscious choice, that is biased by co-occurring reminding.  For 
instance, we could replace the sentence generation task used here with a semantic verification 
task, in which we record the time taken to verify some fact (e.g., “A shot can leave a mark on 
your arm.”)  The fact should take longer to verify if it uses a word you have already seen and that 
you initially interpreted with a different meaning (e.g., a shot of whiskey.)  
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CONCLUSION 
These experiments concentrated on the influence of reminding on understanding of very 
specific, isolated stimuli – singly presented words, without the usual rich semantic context a 
reader encounters in normal text.  But remindings likely also influence understanding in a more 
naturalistic, contextually rich environment.  Additionally, their potential implications in category 
learning, as well as some limitations of the present research, have been outlined here.  
But that is only a start – though we may not realize it, many of the problems our mind 
solves daily are grossly underconstrained by information in the environment. We bring to bear a 
surprising amount of background knowledge to deal with these potential ambiguities (e.g., Nagy 
& Gentner, 1990; Markman, 1984; Biederman, 1987). Much work has elaborated on our use of 
general information (e.g., schemas, heuristics) to make sense of the world.  Reminding theory 
complements these other approaches by predicting the influence of specific, similar earlier 
instances (e.g., the word I learned yesterday which means “to investigate”, the weird striped fish 
I saw in the lake) rather than just general information (e.g., category knowledge or schemas 
about verbs or fish). Further research will determine if remindings are as fundamental to our 
efficient understanding of the world.  
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1 
Proportion of non-dominant homograph interpretations contingent on background recognition 
response 
Condition 
Background Recognition Response 
Correct Yes Incorrect No Correct No Incorrect Yes 
Same 0.358 (324) 0.067 (15) X X 
Different 0.128 (164) 0.182 (11) 0.205 (151) 0.091 (11) 
Reverse X X 0.244 (324) 0.25 (24) 
Note. An X denotes a response that is not possible in that condition (i.e., in the same condition, a 
“no” is never correct, since all homographs are paired with a background’s second presentation). 
The number of observations for each cell is shown in parentheses. 
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Table 2  
Homograph interpretation by condition in Experiment 1, broken down by the counterbalancing 
variable list order. The proportion of homographs that were interpreted using the non-dominant 
(cued) meaning is shown in the same, different, and reverse conditions, respectively. 
List order 
 
Proportion of nondominant meaning interpretation 
Same Different Reverse 
List 1 (n = 11) 0.357 0.088 0.246 
List 2 (n = 7) 0.297 0.208 0.305 
List 3 (n = 8) 0.365 0.218 0.183 
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Table 3  
Homograph interpretation by condition in Experiment 1, either weighted or unweighted. The 
unweighted means reduce the strange different condition effect by reducing the influence of the 
list order for which the effect most strongly occurred. 
 
 
Proportion of nondominant meaning interpretation 
Same Different Reverse 
Weighted 
(each subject 
equally) 
0.343 0.160 0.243 
Unweighted 
(each list 
equally) 
0.340 0.171 0.245 
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Table 4 
Proportion of non-dominant homograph interpretations contingent on background recognition 
response in Experiment 2. 
Condition 
Background Recognition Response 
Correct Yes Incorrect No Correct No Incorrect Yes 
Same 0.401 (409) 0.429 (35) X X 
Different X X 0.310 (403) 0.364 (33) 
Reverse X X 0.281 (399) 0.270 (37) 
Note. An X denotes a response that is not possible in that condition (i.e., in the same condition, a 
“no” is never correct, since all homographs are paired with a background’s second presentation). 
The number of observations for each cell is shown in parentheses. 
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Figure 1. A screenshot from the word list presentation phase of the experiment, showing a word 
superimposed on a background image. 
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Figure 2. Homograph interpretation by condition in Experiment 1. The proportion of 
homographs that were interpreted using the non-dominant (cued) meaning is shown in the same, 
different, and reverse conditions, respectively. 
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Figure 3. Experiment 1. Proportion of previously seen words from each condition that were 
correctly recognized in the word recognition test. In other words, the hit rate for same, different, 
and reverse. 
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Figure 4. Word recognition performance on the final recognition test in Experiment 1. The hit 
rate (proportion of correct “yes” responses) is shown separately for cues and homographs in the 
same, different, and reverse conditions. The false alarm rate (proportion of incorrect “yes” 
responses) is shown at the top. 
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Figure 5. Homograph interpretation by condition in Experiment 2. The proportion of 
homographs that were interpreted using the non-dominant (cued) meaning is shown in the same, 
different, and reverse conditions, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S
D
R
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
P
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
 o
f 
n
o
n
-d
o
m
in
a
n
t 
in
te
rp
re
ta
ti
o
n
s
Condition
 46 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Critical words (cues or homographs) recalled by condition in Experiment 2. The 
proportion of critical words generated in the final recall test in the same, different, and reverse 
conditions, respectively. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Cue-Homograph pairs used in Experiment 1 
 
Table 1A 
Word Type Word Type 
Cue Homograph Cue Homograph 
whiskey shot wise sage 
sick well skyscraper story 
bowl punch money dough 
radio speaker look peer 
race lap tree palm 
influence lobby fish perch 
tennis court committee board 
hair comb smell rank 
watched saw glide coast 
fireplace poker drink straw 
heavy light joke gag 
healthy fit river bank 
ball marble airplane land 
dispose shed hunter game 
cards spade interrogate grill 
eye pupil crazy nut 
sick cold hit ram 
famous star bird swallow 
glance watch dismiss fire 
title deed fig date 
field plain eat fast 
  . . 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Cue-Homograph pairs used in Experiment 2 
 
Table 2A 
Word Type Word Type 
Cue Homograph Cue Homograph 
sick well wise sage 
bowl punch             money dough 
radio speaker look peer 
race lap tree palm 
tennis court fish perch 
watched saw glide coast 
healthy fit drink straw 
ball marble joke gag 
dispose shed hit ram 
cards spade title deed 
sick cold fig date 
famous star eye pupil 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
